This paper focusses on mental state adjectives and offers a unified analysis in the theory of Generative Lexicon (Pustejovsky, 1991 (Pustejovsky, , 1995 . We show that, instead of enumerating the various syntactic constructions they enter into, with the different senses which arise, it is possible to give them a rich typed semantic representation which will explain both their semantic and syntactic polymorphism.
Introduction
Recently, work in computational semantics and lexical semantics has made an interesting shift. Motivated by a concern for lexical organization and global coherence in the structure of lexicon, some researchers have moved towards nlore expressive semantic descriptions, as well as more powerful methods of combining them (see for example Pustejovsky, 1991 Pustejovsky, , 1995 Briscoe, 1993) . This article will exploit one of these theories, The Generative Lezicon (GL: Pustejovsky, 1995) , and extend it for the treatment of French mental adjectives. The following section summarizes the problematic behaviour of these adjectives. The GL approach is then described, and a GL analysis of the data.
2
The Data
Mental adjectives which denote an emotional state or a competence (agent-oriented, following Ernst, 1983 ) present interesting syntactic and semantic polymorphic behaviour, as noted in the literature (see for example Leh~er, 1990 and Croft, 1984) . In this paper, we focus on the representative members of these classes in I and Ih
We would like to thank James Pustejovsky for extensire discussions on the data presented in this article. Thanks also to Laurence Danlos and Graham Russell for their conunents. I Emotional adjectives: triste 'sad', furieuz 'angry, furious', irritg 'irritated', heureuz 'happy', ennuyg 'bored'.
II Agent-orlented adjectives: intelligent, ingdnieuz 'clever', habile 'skilful', adroit 'dextrous'.
Both classes of adjectives exhibit the property of syntactic polyvalency, being able to appear in several distinct contexts, with optional complement structures (as illustrated in (1), (2) and (3)). In the case of agent-oriented adjectives, the complement expresses the manifestation of the state and call be realized as an infinitive with d/pour or de (examples (2a,b) ) or a prepositional phrase (2c): (2a,b,c)means that somebody is skilful in what he does or how he does it (see Croft, 1984) .
(1) Cet homme est triste/habile/furieux "This man is sad/clever/angry TM (2) a. Cet homme est habile de partir "This man is skilful to leave" b. Cet homme est habile £/pour tricher "This man is skilful at cheating" c. Cet homme est habile au bridge "This man is skilful at bridge"
In the case of emotional state adjectives, this complement typically expresses the cause of the emotional state and may be realized as an deinfinitive or a que-sentence: (3a,b) , for example, means that somebody is sad/angry because of something. Notice however that, in some contexts, the complement can also refer to the manifestation of the state, as for agent-orlented adjectives (3c).
(3) a. Cet homme est triste/furieux de partir "This man is sad/angry to leave" b. Cet homme cst triste/furieux que tu partes "This man is sad/angry that you are leaving"
1 We give in quotes a literal translation of the French examples.
c. Cet hoInme est triste en jouant an piano "This man is sad at playing piano" Another property exhibited by these adjectives is that of multiple semantic selection: that is, they are able to predicate of different semantic types (examples (4) to (7)), namely nouns denoting individuals (the 'a' examples), objects (b) and events (c). This can however not be generalized to the whole class of mental states adjectives, as shown by (7), for example.
(4) a. Un homme triste "A sad man" b. Un livre triste "A sad book" e. Un examen triste "A sad exam" (5) a. Un homme furieux "An angry man" b. Un livre furieux "A furious book" c. Une destruction furieuse "A furious destruction" (6) a. Un homme ingdnieux "A clever man" b. Un livre ing6nieux "An clever book" c. Un examen ing~nieux "An clever exam" (7) a. Un homme irritfi/ennuyfi "An irritated/bored man" b. *Un livre irrit~/ennuy6 "An irritated/bored book" c. *Une destruction irritde/ennuyfi "An irritated/bored destruction"
Finally, the third interesting property manifested by these adjectives is their pattern of polysemy. They exhibit different senses depending on the semantic type of the item modified: when they predicate of an individual, they normally denote the mental state of this individual (8) (but see example (12)).
(8) Un homme triste/ing~nieux/furieux "A sad/clever/angry nlan" -~ which is in a sad/clever/angry state When they modify an event or an object, they can take either a causative (gb) or a manifestation sense (9c, 10e and 11c). In the former case, the object or event is the cause of the stat% while in the latter it is the manifestation of the state. In some specific contexts, the causative sense is also possible with individuals (12). A complication arises with respect to the polysemous behaviour of emotion adjectives, in that when they modify an object or an event (9, 10), they can have both the causal and the manifestation senses (gb,e). For some emotion adjectives as furieux (11), the manifestation sense is even the only one available (llc).
The remainder of this paper will present an explanation of the syntactic and semantic behaviour of these adjectives within the framework of Generative Lexicon theory (henceforth GL). In partitular, instead of enumerating all syntactic constructions and the different senses for these adjectives, we will provide a rich typed semantic representation which explains both the semantic and the syntactic polymorphism associated with these classes. This representation and the way to project it at the syntax level will be the focus of the following section.
3

Mental Adjectives in Generative Lexicon
General approach
In the rest of the article, we will propose the fop lowing approach:
(a) to distinguish emotion adjectives and agent-oriented adjectives by means of their qualia structure;
(b) to represent the semantic ambiguity of mental adjectives by use of dotted types (Pustejovsky 1995, chapter 6.2);
(e) to explain specific semantic selection by the notion of headedness (Pustejovsky 1995, chapter 5 .3).
The two first points will be the object of section 3.2 and the third one of 3.3. Section 4 will then focus on emotion adjectives. ,3.2 Two kinds of adjective with dotted type
The emotional state (I) and agent-orlented (Ii) adjectives will be given the GL representations (13) and (14), respectively. These structures encode several different aspects of the semantics for these adjectives.
The event structure (EVENTSTtL) indicates that mental adjectives have a complex event structure. They denote n, cntal state (el) (examlJes (1) to (3)), but they are also able to make reference to events, the cause of the state (c2) and/or its manifestation (ca) (as shown in examples (4) to (7)). The Restr(iction) relation indicates the temporal precedence between the state and the two events: the cause (e2) must precede the state and the manifestation (e3) must follow it. The two events are default events, as the adjective ~:emains a state, even when it; has a causative sense, contrary to real transitions (a.ecomplishnw.nt or achievement), like eouler 'sink', for example (as pointed out in Pustejovsky, 1995, chapter ] 0)
The argument structure (AltC~STIQ specifies that mentM adjectives select; for two arguments, one for human (argl) and a second for event (see Croft, 11984 , for a similar view). The second is a default argument (D_argJ) as it need not to be present at the syntactic level (as shown in exampies (1)). As agent-oriented adjectives refer to the manifestation of the state (examples (2)), the second argmnent is e3, the event which follows the state. It is subtyped as an intellectual act. For emotion adjeetlves, the second argument is c2 or e3, as they can refer either to the manifestation of the. state (example (3e)) or its cause (examples (3a,b)). e2 is subtyped as an experiencing event, as we consider that the cause of an emotion corresponds to the experiencing of sonlething. I,'ollowing Croft (1990) , we think that there are two processes implied in a causal emotional state: an cxperiencer must direct his or her attention to a stimulus and this causes the experiencer to enter ill a mental state.
The qualla structure (QUALIA) encodes the basic semantic type of a word (its Lexical Coilceptual Paradigm, or LCP) and specifics how it is linked to other events and arguments of the event and argument structures (see Pustejovsky, 1995, chapter 6) . To do this, it call use four possible different roles: the FORMAL role encoding the basic semantic type(s) of the word, the CONsTrru'rIw,; role its constitutive elements, the TELIC role its purpose or function and the AGENTIVE role the factors involved in bringing it about. In terms of temporal relations, the qualia encode specific constraints on the relative temporal ordering of the wducs of tile quMia. That is, the event involved in the AGENTIVE role precedes that state existing ill the FORMAL) alld the associated CONSTITUT1VI,) vMne, shonhl there be one. Finally, the T]~LIC role is inherently a tcinporal consequence of the FOlt-MAI,, cf. (15).
(15) AGENTIVE < FORMAl, and CONST < TEL1C
In the case of mental adjectives, the qualia in (13) and (14) makes explicit that they denote a complex or dotted type (written ~ype.type), which is the product of basic types, st and e2 for agentoriented adjectives and el, e2 and e3 for emotive ones. Each of these types can be projected independently, if no other constraints apply (see 3.3). The state cl is encoded in the ~'OttMAL; an event encoded in the AGENTIVE role (e2) denotes the cause or origin of the state, i.e. the experiencing event; encoded in the TELIC role (e3), it denotes then the manifestation of the state, i.e. the intellectual act.
In other words, the (ll, representation for emoti(m adjectives (13) stipulates that somebody (a:) is in a state because of an experiencing ewmt (e2), which can have a further manifestation (e3); 2 that lot agent-oriented adjectives (14) specifies that somebody is in n state which can have ~L manifestation.
3.3
The notion of head However, not all mental adjectives will be able to project the two types they denote (i.e. state and event), depending on the event headeduess, in GL, the notion of head provides a way of indicating a type of foregronnding and baekgronnding of event arguments. In doing this, it specifies how to project the qualia representation and acts as a filter to constrain the set of projectable qualia: the headed event projects the tbrnlula associated with that event and it; is this formula which needs to be saturated at the syntax level (Pustejovsky, 1995, (Jhapter 6.2.5) .
For mental adjectives, two kinds of headedness are possible. The adjective can be headed either on the state or the event it denotes. Moreover, some adjectives will be unspecified regarding the head and will therefore be able to be headed on any of the subevents of the event structure. In the following, we will first focus on the two different kinds of headedness, applying to the state or one of the events, and then show the consequences of an headless structure.
3.3.1 Event structure headed on the state The adjective is projected via the template P(el,z) in the formal role. It therefore denotes the mental state of an individual (16a, 17a) and requires only one argument z of type human. Complements are however possible if they make direct reference to the agentive (as in (16b,c), where the complement is the cause of the emotional state) or relic roles (as in (17b,c), where it is the manifestation). The qualia representation is rich enough to explain the syntactic polyvalency shown in (16) and (17). There are indeed two ways of referring to a quale role:
Direct saturation of a quale role. The complement is identified as a subtype of the experiencing event or the intellectual act. In (16b) and (17b), for example, the complement directly saturates the event e2 or e3 (as the qualia structures in (18) and (19) make explicit). Partir is indeed a subtype of the experiencing event sort (parfir < ezperiencing_event) and les dchecs (chess) of the intellectual act one (les dchecs < creative-intellectual_act). By contrast, in order for (20) to be an acceptable sentence, ~tre malade 'be ill' must be reconstructed, non-standardly, as an intellectual act. Saturation of the object of the experiencing or intellectual act event. In (16c) and (17c), the complement is the object (y) of an implicit event and the saturation of the quale is only possible because the complement can be coerced to the type expected for the complement (the experiencing event or intellectual act): (16c) means that I'm sad~furious because I ezperience your leaving (as (21) makes explicit) and (17c) that I'm ingenious at performing ~he intellectual ac~ whose object is the departure (as in (22)). There is no further specification available for the ezp_ev or intellectual-acLev variable. These two ways of saturating a quale explain what Croft (Croft, 1984) and Ernst (1985) have called the verbal/factive ambiguity of two arguments agent-oriented adjectives (see also Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1979) . When the event is saturated, we get the eventual sense: in (17b), cleverness is predicated of the manner of playing chess (structure 19); when the object of the event is saturated, we get the faetive sense so that in (17c) cleverness is predicated of the fact of leaving (structure 22).
Event structure headed on an event
Recall that the adjective denotes one or two events, i.e. e2 or e3 in (13) and (14). When the event structure is headed on one of these, the adjective is projected via the agentive or the relic role, i.e. the template P (e2, z,...) or P(e3, z,...) . It therefore selects for an event and gets the causative or manifestation sense (examples (23) and (24)). However, that does not mean that the noun must be an event, but only that its semantic representation, or general knowledge concerning its semantic type, should provide an event, as shown in the next examples (23) and (24). (23) Ce livre est triste "The book is sad" a. ~ whose reading causes somebody to be sad b. -~ whose writing causes somebody to be sad c. -~ whose writing is the manifestation of somebody's sadness (24) Ce sapin est triste "The pine tree is sad" a. ~ whose experiencing causes somebody to be sad In (23), the modification by the adjective is possible as livre (book) contains in its qualia structure two events, namely life (to read) (relic of livre) and derire (to write) (agentive of livre) (see Pustejovsky and Bouillon, 1995, for the qualia representation of livre). Two causative interpretations (23a,b) and one manifestation (23c) are therefore possible. Notice that when the events are defined in the lexical semantics of the word, the experiencing and the manifestation are intentional and controlled (the experiencing is active, following Lehrer, 1990) . In (24) on the other hand, there is nothing contributed by the ~ree per se to how the experiencing is achieved (as the noun has no telic nor agentive), except for it being a physically manifested object with extension. In this case, it is the properties inherited through the formal (and not the lexical semantics of the word) that suggests how it can be experienced. For this reason, the experiencing is not controlled, nor intentional (it is stative). The manifestation sense is impossible as sapin (versus book) has no intellectual act in its qualia. 8.3.8 Unheaded event structure. If certain adjectives can be restricted to be headed either on the event or the state, others can be left underspecified regarding the head. In this last case, the adjective can then be projected via the formal or the telic/agentive roles and combines the two or three different senses: stative, causative and/or manifestation, depending on the number of events it can refer to (one for agent-oriented adjectives (see (14)), two for emotional ones (see (13))). This is the case of the adjectives triste and ingdnieuz which will get respectively the three and two senses, as illustrated in (8) to (10); in (8), triste and inggnieu~ have the head on the formal role and the adjectives have a stative sense; in (9c) and (10c) on the telic: they have a manifestation sense. In (9b), triste has the head on the agentive and receives its causative sense. Their semantic polymorphism is then explained, without having to list the different senses.
Remember however that all emotional state adjectives which combine a stative and a eventual meaning will not be able to get the three meaniugs: the emotion adjective furieuz, for example, cannot have the head on the agentive, as shown in (llb): un livre furieu~ cannot get the causative meaning. The question is then what prevents this adjective from having the head on the agentive role? A first attempt at tackling the problem follows from the observation that most emotion adjectives ending in -euz (with causal complement and not derived from psychological verbs, as ennuyeu$, ouirageu~, etc.) behave in the same way (see the list in (25)) and that, more generally, the suffix plays a drucial role in restricting the head (see Anseombres, 1995, for a similar view and section 4 for other examples of the influence of the suffix). It seems therefore not too preliminary to think that the -euz suffix acts as a filter on the head for this kind of adjectives. However, the formal representation of the suffixes and the way it interacts with the representation of the stem remain to be investigated. (25) heureuz, anzieuz, malheuT'euz, honteu~, soucieuz, etc. In this section, we explained the polyvalency of mental adjectives. We are now able to show how the head distinction is relevant to classify emotional states adjectives and explain their semantic selection.
4
Semantic selection: the case of emotion adjectives
On the basis on the headedness configuration, we will distinguish three classes of French emotion adjectives, exemplified in (26), (27) and (28) Those in (26) will have the head on the state and will get only the stative sense. As predicted, they will not be able to modify an event or an object, as illustrated in (29).
(29) *Vn livre f£ch~/ennuy~/irrit~ "An angry/bored/irritated book"
The ones in (27) will have the head on the agentive and will receive only a causative sense. As a result, they will keep this causative sense, even when they modify a noun of type human (30).
(30) Un homme ennuyant/pr6occupant/ admirable/effroyable -+ which causes somebody's trouble/ anxiety/admiration/fright Finally, those in (28) will not be specified regarding the head (they are headless) and will be able to combine the three senses (except when the suffix acts as a filter, as shown in (25)). They can therefore modify nouns of type human, objec~ and eveng (5) and will be ambiguous when they modify a noun of type human, as an hmnan can be either in a mental state or the object of an experiencing event (31a,b). In the case of ambiguity, it is striking to see that French syntax distinguishes clearly the two senses. In (31a), it is the prenominal position of the adjective and in (31c) the choice of the preposition d (versus de as in (5b)) which give rise to the causative sense (versus the stative one).
(31) a. De tristes enfants "Sad children to see" --~ which cause the sadness of the persons which experience them b. Des enfants tristes "Sad children" which are in a sad state c. Un homme triste k voir "A sad man to see" which causes the sadness of the persons which see him As a result of this, (32a) (vs. (32b)) will be impossible: in (32a), the prenominal position of the adjective forces the causative sense, giving rise to an incompatibility as two different nouns (namely enfant (children) and mort de leur m~ve (death of the mother)) try to saturate the same variable y, i.e. the object of the experiencing.
(32) a. *De tristes enfants de la mort de leur lnere b. Des enfants tristes de la mort de leur
Inere
To finish, notice that in (28), (29) and (30), the role of the suffix appears clearly: for emotion adjectives, the -d suffix constrains the head to be on the state and -anti-able on the causative event. It also explains possible divergences between French and English.
Conclusion
In this article, we extended GL to the treatment of French mental state adjectives. We showed how GL can adequately account for the following:
(a) Avoiding the multiplication of entries.
The different senses of the mental adjectives (examples (11)to (14))and their polyvalency (examples (3) to (5)) follows from the qualia representation.
(b) Explaining the links between the different senses of mental adjectives. The qualia structure we proposed in (15) and (16) makes explicit the links between the ditl~rent senses of mental adjectives (mental state of an individual, causative and manifestation). In (15), the qualia structure specifies that emotional states are caused by a causal event and can have a further manifestation; in (16), that the agent-oriented state can have a fnrther manifestation.
(c) Explaining the semantic selection of mental state adjectives. The specific semantic selection of mental adjectives follows from the headcdness system.
(d) Distinguishing two kinds of adjectives: those which denote simple type (rouge (red), grand (big), etc.) and those like mental adjectives which denote dotted type. This distinc-tion is in accordance with the classical distinction drawn between stative adjectives and dynamic ones, which, following Quirk et al., 1994:434 , denote qualities that are thought to be subject to control by possessor. GL allows this distinction to be characterized and given a more formal representation, an adjective being dynamic if it refers to the cause or its further manifestation.
